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Article 4

SOME ASPECTS
OF
JONATHAN SWIFT'S
PERSPECTIVE
ON
LANGUAGE
W. Keith Percival

nature of language was often discussed in the sevenf
teenth and eighteenth centuries in connection with two
problems. The first was how to distinguish man from the
brute animals on the one hand, and from automata on the other. The
nature of language was relevant to this problem because it was believed
that the possession of language and the rational use of it distinguished
human beings both from animals and from the most ingeniously
conceived machines possible. In other words, speech could be
regarded as the essential defining attribute of man.^

' It goes without saying that this notion of a close link between speech and man was not the
creation of the seventeenth century. A good case in point is Erasmus's essay Lingi/a, where
the idea is extensively developed. Whether Jonathan Swift was familiar with this particular
work would be a question well worth investigating. It may be recalled that the Leiden edition
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The second problem was how to attain certain knowledge and
terminate the endless disputes that were plaguing philosophical and
reMgious discussions at that time. For instance, Leibniz (1646-1716),
who illustrates this particular concern, once wrote a paper with the
suggestive title Discours touchant la methode de la certitude et I'ari d'inventer,
pourfinir les disputes etpourfaire en peu de terns de grands progres? The quest
for reliable knowledge clearly involves the use of language; hence if the
goals of philosophy were not being attained, it might be thought that
this failure could, at least in part, be attributed to the faulty use of
language. From considerations of this kind there arose a variety of
proposals put forward by a number of philosophers whose aim was
either to regulate the use of language, or to invent something other
than ordinary language to meet the goals of rational inquiry in a more
satisfactory manner. I shall develop these points later in this paper.
Now it might be imagined, perhaps, that Jonathan Swift, a literary
satirist with a jaundiced view of the age in which he was living, a man
whose contempt for the new science was boundless, would be
uninterested in such topics and perhaps even unaware that they were
being debated. However, evidence that he had more than a fleeting
interest in these controversies is not difficult to find.^ I shall confine
my attention to his most famous work, Gulliver's Travels, first published
in 1726.
In the second book of Gulliver's Travels, which relates the hero's
voyage to Brobdingnag, an imaginary country in which everything is on
a huge scale, an episode occurs that involves some of the issues that I
have just mentioned. When Gulliver is presented by the Queen of
Brobingnag to her husband, the King's first reaction is to take
Gulliver for an animal. He "asked the Queen after a cold Manner, how

of the works of Erasmus, the Opera omnia,which was edited by Leclerc, came out in the first
years of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the volume in which Lingua appeared is the fourth
volume of that series, and it appeared in 1703. Hence, Swift could well have consvilted it.
^ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnk, Optra philoslipbica quae exstant Lalina, GalUca, Germanica omnia,
edited by Johann Eduard Erdmann (Berlin: Eichler, 1840; reprint Aalen: Scientia, 1959),
172-76.
'
' See, for instance, Ann Cline Kelly, Swift and the English Language (Philadelphia; University of
Pennsylvania Press,1988); Douglas Lane Patey, "Swift's Satire on 'Science' and the Structure
of Gulliver's Travels," and Jenny Mezciems, "The Unity of Swift's Woyage to Laputa':
Structure as Meaning in Utopian Fiction," in Claude Rawson, ^A.,Jonathan SniftiA Collection
of CriticalEssags (Engjewood Cliffs; Prentice Hall, 1995), 216—40, and 241-63 respectively.
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long it was since she grew fond of a Splackmck\ {ot such it seems he
took me to be, as I lay upon my Breast in her Majesty's right Hand."^
A splacknuck. Swift explains, is "an Animal in that Country very finely
shaped, about six Foot long."^
The Queen immediately has Gulliver speak to the King and give
an account of himself. At this point
the King, although he be as learned a Person as any in his
Dominions and had been educated in the Study of Philoso
phy, and particularly Mathematicks; yet when he observed my
Shape exactly, and saw me walk erect, before I began to speak
[italics mine], conceived I might be a piece of Clock- work
(which is in that Country arrived to a very great Perfection)
contrived by some ingenious Artist. But when he heard my
Voice, and found what I delivered to be regular and rational,
he could not conceal his Astonishment. He was by no means
satisfied with the Relation I gave him of the Manner I came
into his Kingdom; but thought it a Story concerted between
Glumdalclitch and her Father, who had taught me a Sett of
words to make me sell at a higher Price. Upon this Imagina
tion he put several other Questions to me, and still received
rational Answers."^
Thus, the King is trying to decide whether Gulliver is an animal,
an automaton, or a human being. Looking at GuUiver's appearance the
King first cannot decide whether Gulliver is an animal or a piece of
clockwork. However, when Gulliver speaks the King is ready to be
convinced that he is not an automatbn, but thinks that he may be an
animal that has been taught a set piece, in the same way a parrot is
taught to utter a certain phrase, but nevertheless cannot be credited
with the intelligent use of language. To discover whether Gulliver is
really human, therefore, the King challenges him to use language like
a human being, and on finding that Gulliver does indeed make ration^
answers to his questions has to conclude that he is a human being.
•* Herbert Davis, ed., The Prose WorAs of Jonathan Swifts vol. 11: Gultiver's Travels 1726 (Oxford;
Basil Blackwell, 1941), 87. I shall refer to this edition henceforth as "Davis."
^ Davis, 81,
' Davis, 87.
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There is scarcely an element in this story, however, that is not a
faithful reflection of arguments used in seventeenth-century discussions
of man's rationality. To take a famous example, Rene Descartes in his
Discours de la methode (1637) after describing the physiology of the
human body in mechanistic terms warns his readers not to imagine that
machines having the same outward appearance as human beings and
capable of imitating our overt behaviour would be mistaken for human
beings. For whereas an automaton with the appearance of a monkey
or some other animal devoid of reason would be indistinguishable from
a living animal, the same would not be true of similar machines made
to resemble human beings. For, says Descartes,
we should always have two very certain tests by which to
recognise that, for all that, they were not real men. The first
is, that they could never use speech or other signs as we do
when placing our thoughts on record for the benefit of
others. For we can easily understand a machine's being
constituted so that it can utter words, and even emit some
responses to action on it of a corporeal kind, which brings
about a change in its organs; for instance, if it is touched in
a particular part it may ask what we wish to say to it; if in
another part it may exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on.
But it never happens that it arranges its speech in various
ways, in order to reply appropriately to everything that may
be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can
do.^
In a similar vein, Leibniz in his Nouveaux essais sur I'entendement
humain, written in 1704 as a detailed critique of John Locke's earlier
Concerning Human Understanding (dating from 1690), says^ largely
paraphrasing Locke:
Just as orang-outangs and other monkeys possess the organs
> but do not form words, parrots and certain other birds may

' The PhilosophicalWritings of Descartes, translated and edited by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R.
T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), vol. 1,116. Henceforth "Haldane
and Ross."

I
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be said to have words but no language. For these birds and
several others will be taught to make sounds distinct enough,
which yet, by no means, are capable of language. Only man
is in a position to use these sounds, as signs of internal
conceptions; whereby they might be made known to
others."®
Precisely this point had been made earlier by Descartes in the
Discours de la methode. In examining the question of how men differ
from animals, Descartes wrote:
It is very remarkable that there are none so depraved and
stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot
arrange different words together, forming of them a state
ment by which they make known their thoughts; while, on
the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and
fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same.
It is not the want of organs that brings this to pass, for it is
evident that magpies and parrots are able to utter words just
like ourselves, and yet they cannot speak as we do, that is, so
as to give evidence that they think of what they say.' ; •
Thus, it is not outward appearance that defines a human being, for
an automaton could in principle be designed to look like a man.
Hence, the King of Brobdingnag's scepticism at the mere sight of
Gulliver was justified. Nor is it the performance of specific actions, for
machines can be designed for specific purposes. Nor is it the mere
uttering of vocal sounds, since some animals can be trained to utter a
given string of vocal sounds. Rather, it is the ability to carry on rational
discourse, and it is only by demonstrating this ability that Gulliver can
establish a claim to be rational and hence a human being.

' G. W Leibniz, Nem Essays oit Human Understanding, translated and edited by Petei Remnant
and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Book 3, Chapter 1,
§§1-2, 274-75. Even more pointedly, Leibniz states (274): "As regards organs, those of
monkeys are apparently just as well adapted as ours for formingspeech, yet they show not the
slightest progress in this direction. Hence they must lack something invisible." (English
translation mine]
' Haldane and Ross, 117.
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If Swift shares this attitude to the problems of language with his
contemporaries and immediate predecessors, is there evidence that he
was aware of their concern for methods of pursuing certain truth? To
approach this question, let me briefly examine Swift's description of the
language spoken by the Houyhnhnms, horses endowed with reason, as
related in the fourth book of GulHver's Travels, It will be recalled that
Gulliver caused considerable amazement among the Houyhnhnms by
learning to speak at all: "He [the horse] was more astonished at my
Capacity for Speech and Reason, than at the Figure of my Body,
whether it were covered or no."'" As for the language that the
Houyhnhnms themselves spoke, Gulliver describes it as lacking means
for referring to untruth: "He [the horse] replied, That I must needs be
mistaken, or that I had said the thing that was not. (For they have no
Word in their Language to express Lying or Falsehood.)"" This lack
of terms for falsehood is motivated as follows: "the Use of Speech was
to make us understand one another, and to receive Information of
Facts; now if any one said the Thing that, was not, these Ends were
defeated." In a similar vein. Swift says that "the Houyhnhnms have no
Word in their Language to express any thing that is evil, except what
they borrow from the Deformities or ill Qualities of the Yahoos. The
Yahoos, it will be recalled, were an imaginary race of degenerate human
beings, not endowed with reason.
Hence, any vocabulary item of the language used by the Houyhn
hnms themselves refers to something which exists. There are no words
to refer to what does not exist. Evil does not exist among the Houyhn
hnms, therefore their language provides them with no word for evil.
Similarly, sentences in the language of the Houyhnhnms express truths.
For this reason, when they are discoursing they do not need to seek the
truth. Rather, they already know the truth by instinct and merely use
discourse to formulate it:
Neither is "Reason among them a Point problematical as with
us, where Men can argue with Plausibility on both Sides of a
Question; but strikes you with immediate Conviction; as it

'"Davis, 221.
" Davis, 219.
Davis, 259.
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must needs do where it is not mingled, obscured, or discoh
oured by Passion and Interest. I remember it was ^^tb
extreme Difficulty that I could bring my Master to under
stand the Meaning of the Word Opinion,or bow a Point could
be disputable; because ^asontaught us to affirm or deny only
where we are certain; and beyond our Knowledge we cannot
do either. So that Controversies, Wrangles, and Positiveness
in false or dubious Propositiohs, are Evils unknown among
the Hot^hnhnmsP^^
The Houyhnhnms bad, therefore, achieved the very ideal Aat
Leibniz delineated in the tide of his paper quoted above. They had
reached absolute certainty, and hence had laid aside as no longer
necessary all the wearisome disputations that marred the mtellectoal
scene in Swift's day. But notice the effect of this achievement on their
language. Not only does their language lack terms for many concepts
to us in Europe, but it is a language in which it is not possible
to utter an untruth. Swift, however, does not tell us whether this latter
peculiarity was due to the way in which the language was constructed,
or simply to the manners of the users of the language. In otiier words,
there are two ways in which this result could have been achieved. The
Houyhnhnms could have possessed a language in which a sentence had
to be true in order to be grammatical, or their language could have been
like ours, that is, capable of expressing both truths and untruths, but
the ethics of the speakers could have been so different as to produce
the same result, that is, a set of actually produced sentences none of
which was in fact untrue. But clearly the two possibilities are logically
distinct. '
This somewhat ambiguous picture of the conceptual scheme and
language of the Houyhnhnms becomes perfectly intelligible if viewed
against the background of the second topic 1 mentioned at the
beginning of this paper, namely the discussions being carried on in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries about the methodology of certain
knowledge. In the main, two types of solutions were proposed to the
problem, which may be called the rhetorical and the algebraic.

"Davis, 251.

44

1650-1850

The rhetorical solution took the form of a set of injunctions on
the proper use of language to be followed by the seeker after truth.
The classic exposition of this solution is to be found in the third book
of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. "First, a Man
should take care," Locke urges,"to use no word without a signification,
no Name without an Idea for which he makes it stand." "Secondly,"
says Locke, "'tis not enough a Man uses his Words as signs of some
Ideas: those Ideas he annexes them to, if they be simple must be clear
and distinct."" These are then practical injunctions that direct the
philosopher to make the best use of ordinary language.
The algebraic solution was more radical. Its proponents argued
that ho truths are more certain than those established by mathematical
proof. The characteristic of mathematical proofs, however, is that they
are carried out not on the objects in question, but on conventional
characters and symbols substituted for them. The truths of mathemat
ics are guaranteed by the limited type of operations that were allowed
to be carried out on these characters. If linguistic discourse is to
provide the same service as mathematical proof, it must be modelled
on mathematics. But how can a language be created on a mathematical
model? The only way this can be achieved is to establish the ultimate
irreducible vocabulary of human thoughts, the set of atomic concepts
implicit in all ordinary discourse, and then to lay out the set of
permissible operations whereby thoseindivisible units of thought might
be combined to form propositions, sentences, and so on. Hence, in
this approach the emphasis is on a set of primitive units of thought and
their cbmbinability by means of explicit operations.
As is well known, the number of scholars in Britain who dabbled
in ideas of this nature in the late seventeenth century was considerable.
For instance, in 1668 one of the founders of the Royal Society, Bishop
John Wilkins (1614—1672), published a book entided An Essay towards
a ^al Character, and a Philosophical Language, in which he outlines a
writing system that would exactly mirror the semantic structure of
words and sentences by means of different combinations of signs

" John Locke, An B.ssy Concerning Human Understanding, Book 3, chap. 11, §§8-9. I am
quoting here from the critical edition prepared by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975), 512. Norman Kretzmann discusses Locke's semantic theory in his article 'The
Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory," in Herman Parret, ed.. History of Linguistic Thought
and ContemporaryUn^dstics (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976), 331-47.
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representing the elements of discourse." A similar project had already
been proposed a few years before by George Dalgarno in a book
Art of Signs or aUniversal Character andPhilosophicalLanguage}^
The subtide of Dalgarno's book continues:
By means of which speakers of the most diverse languages
will in the space of two weeks be able to communicate to
each other all the notions of the mind (in everyday matters),
whether in writing or in speech, no less intelligibly than in
their own mother tongues. Furthermore, by this means also
the young will be able to imbibe the principles of philosophy
and the true practice of logic far more quickly and easily than
from the common writings of philosophers."
Thus, Dalgarno's aims and procedures were similar to Wdkins's and
were aimed at the same double project of forging a practical medium
of international communication and a tool for possible use in the
practice of logic and philosophy.
The philosophical aspects of such a project were, however,
paramount in the similar proposals of Leibniz. It may be pointed out
that here again these ideas go back at least as far as Descartes. In his
Opuscuks et fragmentsinedits de Ljeibnis^ Louis Couturat reproduces a letter
from Descartes to Mersenne written in 1629, which he (Couturat)
found in Leibniz's unpublished notes. In this letter, Descartes outlines
a plan for a universal language consisting of an ordered set of primitive
words that would make it possible for even the dullest wit to enumerate
all possible human thoughts, just as it is possible to enumerate all
possible numbers once one knows the ten basic digits and the manner
of combining them. Leibniz adds his own remarks at the end of the
transcribed letter, pointing out that this language "will be a marvelous

" On John Wilkins, see Joseph L. Subbiondo, ed., Jotn Wilkins and 17th-Centuty British
Unpdstics, Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, series III;
Studies in the History of the Language Sciences, 67 (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John
Benjamins, 1992).
An signorum, mlgo characteruntvenaSs et Bnguaphihsophica (ponion,1661). A facsimile reprint
was published by Scolar Press (Menston, England) in 1968.
" English translation from David Cram and Jaap Maat, eds., George Dalgarno on Univenal
Langnage; The Art of Signs (1661), The Deaf and Dumb Man's Tutor (1680), and the UtpubBshed
Tapen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 139.
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assistance both in making use of what we already know, and in seeking
out what we lack, and in inventing the topics which depend on
reasoning. For then reasoningand calculating will be the same thing."'®
It seems that Swift was familiar with projects of that kind and
doubdess disapproved of them,as he disapproved of all the newfangled
ideas being expounded by the practitioners of the new science. The
third book of GuUiver's Travels, containing the voyage to Laputa, an
imaginary island in which the inhabitants are engaged on a variety of
speculative scherries, is an extended satire on activities being carried on
at that time by the members of the Royal Society,'® and it is perhaps
not surprising that several references to language projects are found in
that book.
One project "was to shorten Discourse by cutting Polysyllables
into one, and leaving out Verbs and Participles; because in R^eality all
things imaginable are but Nouns." Another was "a Scheme for entirely
abolishing all Words Whatsoever," and the author continues: "siixce ;.
Words are only Names for Things, it would be more convenient for all
Men to carry about them, such Things as were necessary to express the
particular Business they are to discourse on."^ This invention, it was
dt, would serve as an universal Language to be understood in all
civilized Nations, whose Goods and Utensils are generally of the same
Kind, or nearly resembling, so that their Uses might easily be compre
hended. ' Swift points out ironically, however, that this plan might
well have been successfully carried out "if the Women in Conjunction
with the Vulgar and Illiterate had not threatened to raise a Rebellion,

"Louis Couturat,Opuscuksetfraffnentsimditsdeljcibmi^^mA-. Presses Universitairesde France,
1903; Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1961), 28. The English translation is
mine. The original reads; "En attendant elle sera d'un secours merveilleux et pour se servir
de ce que nous s^avons, et pour voir ce qui nous manque, et pour inventer les matieres qui
dependent du raisonnement. Car alors raisonner et calculer sera la mane chose."
" See Marjorie Nicolson and Nora M. Mohler, "The Scientific Background of Swift's Vcyage
to Laputa" Annals of Sdence, 2 (1937), 199-334 and "Swift's "Flying Island' in the Vqpage to
Laputaf Annals of Sdtnce, 2 (1937), 405-30. For a more recent discussion, see Frederick N.
Smith, "Scientific Discourse: GulUver's Travtls Tsad The Philosophical Transactionsf in Frederick
N. Smith, The Genres of Gulliver'sTravels (Newark University of Delaware Press,1990), 139-62.
See also R. S. Crane, "The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas," Reason and
Imaginadon: Studies in the Histoiy of Ideas 1600-1800, edited by J. A. Mazzeo (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962).
^ Davis, 169.
''Davis, 170.
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unless they be allowed the Liberty to speak with their Tongues, after
the Manner of their Forefathers; Such constantirreconcileable Enemies
to Science are the common People."^
In ridiculing the projectors' idea of carrying on their persons all
the things they desired to refer to Swift may have been stimulated by
various contemporary theories that focused on the referential function
of words. Thus, John Locke suggested that words referring to
substances with observable properties ("leading sensible qualities," as
he termed them) are best defined by direct ostension, that is, by
producing an actual example and showing it to one's interlocutor:
Now these leading Qualities, are best made known bj shewing,
and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of
an Horse, or Cassuary, will be but rudely and imperfectly
imprinted on the Mind by Words, the sight of the Animals
doth it a thousand times better; And the Idea of a particular
Colour of Gold, is not to be got by any description of it, but
only by the frequent exercise of the Eyes about it; as is
evident in those who are used to this Metal, who will fre
quently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulter
ate, by the sight, where others, (who have good Eyes, but yet,
by use, have not got the precise nice Idea of that peculiar
Yellow) shall not perceive any difference.^
The fantastic notion of producing actual referents in a discussion
instead of uttering words, however, was not a new idea but a revival of
a motif that goes back to classical antiquity. At the beginning of
Sophistical "Refutations, Aristotle points out that some arguments can be
shown to be spurious because they crucially turn on "names" rather
than "things," and he goes on to argue as follows: "It is impossible in
a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: we use their names
as symbols instead of them; and we suppose that what follows in the
names, follows in the things as well, just as people who calculate
suppose in regard to their counters."^'* However, Aristotle was
^ Davis, 169.
John Locke, An Essy Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, Book 3, chap.
11, §21 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 519.
" SttphisticafRtfietations, 165'6-10. English translation by W A. Pickard-Cambridge.
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perfectly aware that language is not a simple nomenclature, for many
more things exist than words to refer to them: "But the two cases are
not alike. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of accounts,
while things are infinite in number." If Swift was by chance familiar
with Aristode's hypothetical vision, he might well have regarded him
as more sophisticated philosophically than the projectors whom he
ridiculed in the Voyage to luiputa! In other words, it is conceivable that
as a traditionalist Swift may have concluded that, as a result of the
activities of the Royal Society and other developments within the orbit
of the new science in Britain and on the continent, the philosophy of
language had taken a step backwards.
Finally, to return to the contemporary scene, it should be pointed
out that the vehicle of the imaginary voyage afforded Swift a perfect
tool for poking fun at the kind of linguistic projects being discussed by
the members of the Royal Society at that time. By the second decade
of the eighteenth century, the genre of imaginary voyage had been in
vogue for quite some time, and a number of authors had used it to
present Utopian schemes for social and political betterment. It is
interesting to note that it was not unusual for these Utopian novels to
include linguistic fantasies. Thus, in the chapter devoted to the logically
streamlined language spoken by the inhabitants of an imaginary land in
the southern hemisphere, the author Gabriel de Foigny concludes:
"The, advantage of this manner of speech is that one becomes a
philosopher by learning the first elements and that in this country one
cannot refer to anything without at the same time declaring its nature.
That would seem a miracle to anybody who is not privy to the secret
method that the speakers use to achieve this effect."^ In other words,
social betterment comprised linguistic improvement, and significantly
such linguistic Utopias tended to emit a decidedly algebraic odor.^®

The original text reads: "L'avantage de cette fagon de parler est qu'on devient philosophe,
en apprenant les premiers elements, & qu'on ne peut nommer aucune chose en ce pays, qu'on
n'explique sa nature en mane terns: ce qui passeroit pour miraculeux, aupres de ceux qui ne
sont pas avertis du secret dont ils se servent a cet effet" (Gabriel de Foigny, La Terre austrak
connut [1676], edited by Pierre Ronzeaud [Paris: Societe desTestes Fran^ais Modemes, 1990],
163).
^ From the extensive secondary literature dealing with this important aspect of the
Enlightenment, I should like to single out the following articles and books for special
mention: J. R. Knowlson, "The Ideal Languages of Veiras, Foigny, and Tyssot de Patot,"
Journal ofthe Histoty ofIdtasTA (1963), 269-78;James Knowlson, VniversolLangiage Schemes in
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Swift was therefore not only aware of these overly optimistic
schemes and disapproved of them, but he also seems to have believed
that human language is a great deal more complex than the speculators
of that period gave it credit. In addition, he appears to have hinted that
the traditional commonsense approach to language and speech had
much to be said for it. One can only wonder what he might have
thought of nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments in linguis
tics and the philosophy of language, not to mention information
technology.

EnglandandFrance 1600-1800 (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1975); Noam Chomsky,
Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought (New York: Harper and Row,
1966); M. M. Slaughter, Universal Eanguages and Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1982), 85-186; Vivian Salmon, The Stutiji of Language
in 17th-CenturyEnglandflrxditdi.,AmsterdamStudiesin theTheoryandHistory oftheUngidsticSciences,
series 3: Studies in the History of the Language Sciences,17 (Amsterdam: Benjamins,1988); David
Fausett, Writing the Nea> World: Imaginary Vagages and Utopias of the Great Southern Land (Syra
cuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993); Robert E. StUlman, The New Philosoply and Universal
Languages in Seventeenth-Century England: Bacon, Hobbes, and Wilkins (Lewisburg. Bucknell
University Press, 1995).

